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ABSTRACT
Illusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with
skilful situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalized
illusory control in terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration
of the relationship between these deﬁnitions, or the broader construct of agency.
This study used a novel card-guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the
relationship between subjective and behavioural illusory control. We compared trials
in which participants (a) had no opportunity to exercise illusory control, (b) could
exercise illusory control for free, or (c) could pay to exercise illusory control.
Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed explicit and implicit
sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, conﬁdence was higher
when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. In a complementary
model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their conﬁdence was
high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free
condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the
Contingency Judgment task, but were not signiﬁcantly related to Intentional Binding.
These results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory
control and locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency.
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Under conditions of chance, including many forms of
gambling, humans often overestimate their level of
control or skill. In Langer’s (1975) famous experiments
introducing the “illusion of control”, participants who
had the opportunity to choose a lottery ticket
requested a higher price for selling back the ticket
than participants who did not have this opportunity
to choose (mean selling prices: $8.67 vs. $1.96,
respectively). According to Langer (1975), this inap-
propriate expectation of success (termed illusory
control) arises when games of chance employ features
that are typically associated with skilful situations.
As well as a choice (in the lottery experiments), the
opportunity for instrumental action can be a potent
means of eliciting illusory control. For example, in a
ﬁeld study of craps players, players were more likely
to bet and placed higher bets when they were person-
ally throwing (“shooting”) the dice than during other
players’ throws (Davis, Sundahl, & Lesbo, 2000). Similarly,
in a laboratory study of roulette, participants placed
higher bets in a condition where they threw the roulette
ball onto the wheel than when a croupier threw the ball
(Ladouceur & Mayrand, 1987).
Despite some provocative demonstrations of illu-
sory control, and a widespread recognition that the
construct is relevant to gambling policy and the treat-
ment of problem gambling (Fortune & Goodie, 2012;
Grifﬁths, 1993; Ladouceur & Sevigny, 2005), there is
still much that is unclear about the cognitive underpin-
nings of illusory control. The conventional deﬁnition
by Langer (1975) refers to a judgment effect, that
the perceived likelihood of winning (“the expectancy of
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a personal success probability”, p. 311) is altered by
some kind of personal involvement. However, a host
of complementary (but psychologically distinct)
factors may also contribute to these effects. The reluc-
tance to exchange lottery tickets may be linked to
magical beliefs about “tempting fate” (Risen & Gilovich,
2007) or an increased “ownership effect” (i.e., enhanced
value attached to personal possessions; Gawronski,
Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007; Pierce, Kostova, &
Dirks, 2003). Participants may derive greater reward
utility from outcomes that arise from their own behav-
iour than from non-contingent outcomes (e.g., Leotti &
Delgado, 2011; Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004). An over-
estimation effect under conditions of low control may
also reﬂect a more general difﬁculty in discerning the
level of control, such that participants similarly underes-
timate their degree of control when control is actually
high (Gino, Sharek, & Moore, 2011; see also Thompson,
Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998).
Arbitrating between these various mechanisms
has been hampered in part by differences in how
studies have operationalized illusory control. Although
Langer’s (1975) original studies measured pricing
decisions, most subsequent studies have relied upon
subjective ratings as the primary dependent variable,
either of “conﬁdence in winning” or of “perceived
control” (see Presson & Benassi, 1996; Stefan &
David, 2013). Ratings offer a quick means for quantify-
ing illusory control perceptions, but these estimates
tend to be taken after (rather than during) the task
and can therefore be prone to demand characteristics
and memory biases (Ejova, Navarro, & Delfabbro, 2013;
Presson & Benassi, 1996). Moreover, reporting higher
conﬁdence in a given condition does not convincingly
show that the participant is under an illusion. For
a compelling demonstration of a psychological
“illusion”, participants should be willing to actively dis-
advantage themselves (e.g., by paying a cost) in order
to gain or exercise control in a chance situation.
Fewer studies on illusory control have employed
behavioural measures (see Stefan & David, 2013).
Of those that have, some have used relatively “soft”
measures that suffer from similar limitations to subjec-
tive ratings. For example, one procedure involves a
dice-throwing game where rolling a six wins a prize.
Participants are given the choice between throwing
the die themselves, or letting the experimenter
throw the die. Unsurprisingly, the majority of partici-
pants (73%, in Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky,
2009) choose to roll the die themselves (see also Dunn
& Wilson, 1990; Grou & Tabak, 2008; Koehler, Gibbs, &
Hogarth, 1994). However, this bias could again reﬂect
demand characteristics, or a simple wish to be enter-
tained or more involved in the experiment, rather
than a genuine belief that one’s own dice roll is
more likely to win (see Koehler et al., 1994).
Only a small number of studies have examined
whether players will actively disadvantage themselves
to gain illusory control, and the means of disadvanta-
ging the participant has been enacted in a number of
ways. In Langer’s (1975) original report (Experiment 3),
participants who chose their lottery ticket later
rejected an opportunity to exchange the ticket for a
ticket in a second lottery with a higher chance of
winning. In a roulette study where participants could
use a handbrake device to stop the wheel, participants
persisted in using the device when losses were pun-
ished with electric shocks, and even when using the
device reduced the objective probability of success
(and thus increased their probability of receiving a
shock; Friedland, Keinan, & Regev, 1992). In another
study, participants were prepared to buy the right to
choose bet locations on a roulette wheel, rather than
betting on random locations (Dixon, Hayes, & Ebbs,
1998). Perhaps unsurprisingly, these effects are sensi-
tive to the magnitude of the costs involved (Dunn &
Wilson, 1990). Grou and Tabak (2008) found that
most participants (67%) elected to personally roll a
die when it was free to do so, but only 12% paid a
premium for this opportunity. Therefore, the evidence
for participants actively disadvantaging themselves to
exert illusory control is mixed. As gambling necessarily
involves a monetary wager on an uncertain outcome,
it is important to understand participants’ willingness
to pay money in order to exercise control under
conditions of chance. Past work has also neglected
the question of whether subjective and behavioural
deﬁnitions of illusory control are related.
The present study sought to develop a novel exper-
imental task to distinguish between a subjective opera-
tionalization of illusory control based upon conﬁdence
ratings and a behavioural deﬁnition based upon the
participants’ willingness to pay money in order to exer-
cise control in a chance situation. Our task presented 13
playing cards face down around the perimeter of a cir-
cular wheel (see Figure 1), on each trial. A win segment
and a loss segment (both of variable size) overlaid the
cards; participants were told that if the Ace was revealed
in the win segment, they would win a £1 (approximately
$1.50US) prize, and if the Ace was revealed in the loss
segment, they would lose £1. In this way, participants
were encouraged to guess the position of the Ace
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on each trial. In some trials, participants were able
to enact their guesses by rotating the win and loss
segments. This control either was free (the “free spin”
condition), or required the participant to pay a small
fee (the “pay to spin” condition). In a baseline condition,
the position of the win and loss segments was ﬁxed (the
“no control” condition). Conﬁdence ratings were taken
on each trial before the cards were turned over
(which was after subjects made any decision to spin),
to index subjective illusory control. The behavioural
measure of illusory control was deﬁned as the number
of “pay to spin” decisions, demonstrating participants’
willingness to actively disadvantage themselves. As
the number of wins was pre-speciﬁed, each participant’s
ﬁnancial bonus on the task dropped in direct proportion
to their number of pay decisions. By presenting the
three conditions in an inter-leaved, multi-shot game,
illusory control measures could be calculated for each
participant. As previous studies have relied upon
either single-shot, between-groups designs (Friedland
et al., 1992; Grou & Tabak, 2008; Langer, 1975) or
small sample sizes (n = 5; Dixon et al., 1998), the sys-
tematic investigation of individual differences has not
been possible.
In light of these individual difference metrics, our
second aim was to examine how illusory control is
Figure 1. A full trial sequence for the gambling task; win probability is depicted in white, and loss probability is depicted in red. To view this
ﬁgure in colour, please visit the online version of this Journal.
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related to sense of agency. Sense of agency refers to
our experience of control over our environment
(Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012).
Recently, a distinction has been proposed between
implicit and explicit aspects of the sense of agency
(Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Moore et al., 2012; Synofzik,
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). Explicit agency refers to
reﬂective, direct attributions of one’s control over an
event—for example, assessed by subjective ratings
of control on a contingency judgment task (Alloy &
Abramson, 1979). In contrast, implicit agency refers
to a pre-reﬂective feeling of agency, typically
measured by perceptual differences in reaction
times between events that were self-generated
versus externally generated. The “intentional
binding” effect provides an established measure of
implicit agency, referring to the subjective com-
pression of time when a self-initiated action (e.g., a
button press) gives rise to an outcome (e.g., a tone
presented 250 ms later; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014;
Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Obhi,
2012). Changes in the magnitude of intentional
binding are thought to indicate changes in the pre-
reﬂective experience of control over actions and
their outcomes (Moore et al., 2012).
How are individual differences in these implicit and
explicit aspects of the sense of agency related to the
illusion of control? Illusory control may be conceptual-
ized as the faulty experience of agency in a non-
contingent (i.e., chance) environment. This could
arise either as a consequence of a reﬂective attribu-
tional process (explicit agency) and/or a distorted per-
ceptual experience of one’s control (implicit agency).
Some work has suggested that there is a link
between illusory control and reﬂective attributional
processes. Pathological gamblers show elevated
scores on questionnaire measures of illusory control
(Raylu & Oei, 2004; Steenbergh, Meyers, May, &
Whelan, 2002) and were recently found to make
greater overestimations of control (relative to a
healthy comparison group) on a contingency judg-
ment task (Orgaz, Estévez, & Matute, 2013). In the
classic version of this paradigm, the participant must
decide on each trial whether or not to press a
button (the action) in order to illuminate a lightbulb
(the outcome; Alloy & Abramson, 1979). After a block
of trials, participants rate their degree of control over
the lightbulb illuminating. Under conditions of zero
contingency, healthy participants typically overesti-
mate their level of control, and particularly when the
positive outcomes are frequent and are rewarded
(e.g., by winning money). The observation that this
bias was exaggerated in pathological gamblers was
interpreted by Orgaz et al. (2013) as evidence that
the illusion of control is a distributed, domain-
general trait that conveys risk of gambling problems,
although their study did not employ any direct
measures of illusory control in a gambling context.
Other work indicates a link with measures of
implicit agency. The intentional binding procedure is
sensitive to disordered experiences of control in
some clinical groups. For example, schizophrenia is
associated with an abnormal sense of agency (e.g.,
passivity experiences) and exaggerated intentional
binding (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod,
& Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 2010). In patients with Par-
kinson’s disease, intentional binding was also sensitive
to dopamine manipulation (via medication withdra-
wal; Moore et al., 2010). Dopamine is intimately
linked to addictive disorders including pathological
gambling (Boileau et al., 2014). Moore et al. (2010)
hypothesized that an increased implicit sense of
agency is a risk factor for impulse control disorders
including pathological gambling, which are often
seen as a side effect of dopaminergic medication in
Parkinson’s disease.
To formally characterize these relationships
between the illusion of control and the explicit and
implicit aspects of sense of agency, we administered
a Contingency Judgment task (Alloy & Abramson,
1979) and the Intentional Binding task (Haggard
et al., 2002), alongside our novel card-guessing task
of illusory control. We also included a Locus of
Control questionnaire (Levenson, 1973) to assess dis-
positional beliefs in the ability to inﬂuence one’s
environment (Rotter, 1966). Our hypotheses were as
follows. First, at a descriptive level, we expected par-
ticipants to make pay to spin decisions on the card-
guessing task, consistent with a deﬁnition of illusory
control that requires participants to disadvantage
themselves. Second, we predicted that conﬁdence
ratings on the card-guessing task would be higher
on trials where participants chose to spin the wheel
than in the no control baseline condition. Third, we
predicted that the cost involved (free spin, pay to
spin), the probabilities of winning and losing (which
were orthogonalized), and the participants’ conﬁ-
dence on each trial would inﬂuence participants’
choice to spin (see Footnote 2). Finally, we hypoth-
esized that pay to spin decisions and conﬁdence
ratings on the card-guessing task would be correlated
with internal locus of control (i.e., the belief that life
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events are determined by ones behaviour, rather than
a result of external factors), overestimations of control
on the Contingency Judgment task, and the magni-
tude of the intentional binding effect.
Experimental study
Method
Participants
Undergraduate student participants from the Univer-
sity of Cambridge (n = 78, 52.6% male, age range:
18–23 years) were recruited via poster and email
advertisements. Approximately a quarter (26.9%, n =
21) of participants reported that they had gambled
at least once within the past 12 months. The
Problem Gambling Severity Index (Ferris & Wynne,
2001) indicated that our participants were predomi-
nantly non-problem gamblers (score = 0, n = 52,
66.7%) or “low-risk” gamblers (score = 1–2, n = 20,
25.6%), with a small number of “moderate-risk” gam-
blers (score = 3–7, n = 6, 7.7%). No participants were
classiﬁed as “probable problem gamblers” (score > 7).
Self-reported games of choice in the subgroup who
gambled were mostly poker and sports betting. The
study was approved by the University of Cambridge
Psychology Research Ethics Committee.
Participants completed the card-guessing task, the
Contingency Judgment task, and the Intentional
Binding task on a 15′′ Acer laptop, in a counterbalanced
order. Testing sessions lasted approximately 1 hour.
Participants received £5 for their participation, in
addition to a ﬁnancial bonus based on their perform-
ance on the card-guessing task. The raw data are avail-
able on Dspace, the University of Cambridge archiving
repository (http://dx.doi.org/10.17863/CAM.516).
Materials
Card-guessing task. The task was programmed using
Visual Basic Software (see Figure 1, and for participant
instructions, see Appendix). On each trial, a circular
table with wood grain ﬁnish was displayed on a
green background. A “deal” button was displayed to
the right of the table. Upon clicking “deal” on each
trial, 13 cards (the full suit of hearts) were dealt face
down around the perimeter of the table. Two transpar-
ent coloured segments overlaid the cards: a white
“win” segment and a red “loss” segment. The size of
the two segments varied (independently of one
another) between trials, with each covering 1, 3, or 5
cards.1 Each of the nine possible combinations of
win and loss probability segment sizes was presented
within each condition. The win and loss areas did not
overlap and were separated by at least one card. Par-
ticipants were instructed that the aim of the game was
to ﬁnd the Ace on each trial. If the Ace fell within the
win segment, they would win £1, if the Ace lay within
the loss segment they would lose £1, and if the Ace
was revealed outside the two coloured zones, there
was no ﬁnancial outcome.
Three types of trials were presented in a randomized
order. In the baseline no control condition, the pos-
ition of the win and loss segments were ﬁxed, and par-
ticipants could only select the “Reveal Cards” button.
On free spin trials, participants could rotate the win
and loss segments, using two buttons labelled with
clockwise- and anticlockwise- pointing arrows. When
either button was clicked, both segments rotated,
one card at a time. The participant clicked a third
button, “Reveal Cards”, when the desired conﬁgur-
ation was reached. On pay to spin trials, participants
ﬁrst selected between two options, “Reveal Cards” or
“Enable Spin (10 pence)”. If the participant selected
“Reveal Cards”, the trial proceeded as for the no
control condition, whereas if the participant selected
“Enable Spin”, 10 pence was deducted from the par-
ticipant’s balance, and the two arrows were enabled
as in the free spin condition. On every trial, partici-
pants gave an on-screen conﬁdence rating [“How con-
ﬁdent are you of winning?” from “Not at all” (0) to
“Extremely” (100)] after selecting “Reveal Cards”.
When the participant submitted his or her conﬁdence
rating, the 13 cards were turned over, revealing the
Ace location, and any feedback was presented cen-
trally (“Win £1” or “Lose £1” for 2 s, with no ﬁnancial
feedback presented if the Ace was outside the two
coloured zones). There was a 0.5-s inter-trial interval
before the next trial.
Participants played 54 trials (18 trials per condition)
in a single block that took approximately 20 minutes
to complete. Participants were provided with a £3
endowment at the start of the task. Given that the
wins and losses were pre-speciﬁed, their ﬁnancial
bonus on completion varied from £1.40 to £3, as a
direct function of the number of trials in which they
paid to spin.
A debrief questionnaire was administered after the
card-guessing task to assess several factors linked to
illusory control: (a) “How much skill do you think was
involved in winning the task?” (1 = “No skill” to 5 = “A
lot of skill”); (b) “How much additional control do
you think moving the win section gave you?” (1
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= “No more control” to 5 = “A lot more control”); (c)
“Did you use the previous locations of the ace to
help you choose whether to move the win section?”
(1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “Always”); (d) “Did your previous
wins or losses affect your conﬁdence on the next
trial?” (1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “Always”); (e) “Did
moving the win segment affect your conﬁdence of
winning?” (1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “Always”).
Contingency Judgment task. We used a computer-
ized version of the classic Alloy and Abramson
(1979) task. Participants were instructed that their
goal was to illuminate a light bulb as often as possible
(see Gillan et al., 2014), using the space bar. On each
trial, the participant was presented with an unlit
light bulb, and they had 1.5 s to decide whether or
not to make the action. The light bulb would then
either illuminate or fail to illuminate, with auditory
feedback. At the end of each block of 40 trials, partici-
pants rated their degree of control over the lightbulb,
on a scale from 0 (no control) to 100 (complete
control). The true contingency between pressing the
spacebar and the illumination of the light bulb was
ﬁxed at zero, such that control ratings above 0 rep-
resent an overestimation of control.
Participants took 15 min to complete four blocks of
the task, in a 2 × 2 design with counter-balanced
order. The frequency with which the lightbulb illumi-
nated was set at either 25% (low reinforcement) or
75% (high reinforcement). Reinforcement valence
was also manipulated between a win condition
(where each illumination won 5 pence) and a loss con-
dition (where failures to illuminate were penalized
with a 5-pence loss). Thus, the four conditions were:
75% win, 75% loss, 25% win, and 25% loss. Based on
prior work, we expected overestimations of control
to be greatest in the win condition with the high
reinforcement rate (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Gillan
et al., 2014). We also measured the number of space
bar presses, as participants who respond more often
tend to provide greater overestimations of control
(Hannah & Beneteau, 2009; Matute, 1996).
Intentional Binding task (Haggard et al., 2002). This
task involved four conditions (20 trials per condition,
counterbalanced) where the participant judged the
timing of either an action (key press) or a tone. For
each trial, a “Libet clock” (see Libet, Gleason, Wright,
& Pearl, 1983) was presented to the participant on
screen, with a clock hand rotating at one revolution
every 2560 ms. In two operant conditions, the
participant was required to make a key press at the
time of their own choosing, and the key press pro-
duced a tone after a 250-ms delay. After the tone,
the clock hand continued to rotate for a random
period of time (between 1500 and 2500 ms). When
the hand stopped rotating, the participant was
prompted to estimate either the time of their key
press (in the operant action condition) or the time of
the tone (in the operant tone condition). In two base-
line conditions, the participant estimated the time of
their key press (in absence of a tone; the baseline
action condition) or the time of a computer-generated
tone (in absence of a key press; the baseline tone con-
dition). The participants submitted their timing judg-
ments via an on-screen text box. The task took
15 min to complete.
We calculated participants’ timing judgment errors
as the difference between their perceived time of an
event (i.e., key press or tone) and the actual time of
the event. In each case, a positive value indicates
that the event was perceived as occurring later than
it actually occurred, and a negative value indicates
that the event was perceived as occurring earlier in
time than the actual event. Intentional binding
occurs when the perceived onset of an operant
action is shifted forward in time, and the perceived
onset of the resultant tone is shifted backwards in
time compared to baseline judgments of the action
and tone occurrences, respectively (Haggard et al.,
2002). This score was calculated by subtracting the
perceptual shift for action judgments (judgment
error in operant action minus the judgment error in
baseline action) from the perceptual shift for tone
judgments (judgment error in operant tone minus
the judgment error in baseline tone).
Levenson’s Locus of Control Scale (Levenson, 1973).
This 24-item questionnaire assesses participants’ per-
ceived ability to control their environment. The scale
comprises three subscales measuring internal locus
of control (sample M= 33.6, SD = 5.60), external locus
of control by powerful others (M= 19.2, SD = 6.85),
and external locus of control by chance (M= 18.8,
SD = 6.45).
Statistical analysis
Data were analysed using R (R Core Team, Vienna,
Austria), Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) University
Edition (SAS Institute Inc, Cary, NC) and SPSS Statistics
(Version 22, IBM Corp, Armonk, NY). For the analysis of
the card-guessing task, we used multi-level regression,
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where every trial from each subject is entered into a
regression model. Using this approach, the correlation
between trials within a subject is accounted for at one
level of the model, and experimental effects of interest
are investigated at the second level of the model.
Three regression models were carried out on these
trial-by-trial data, using the GENMOD procedure in
SAS. The ﬁrst model investigated predictors of conﬁ-
dence; the second model sought to predict the likeli-
hood of spinning,2 only considering the free and pay
to spin conditions, and the third model obtained a
subjective illusory control measure for each partici-
pant. For the ﬁrst two models, we further subdivided
pay to spin and free spin trials based on whether or
not they chose to spin (free/spin, free/no spin, pay/
spin, pay/no spin). Inspection of the data for the task
revealed that seven participants never spun in any
condition, and these participants were excluded
from the regression models.
Model 1: Conﬁdence. To investigate predictors of con-
ﬁdence across all task conditions, we used a ﬁxed-effect
approach to model the within-subject correlations.
Within a ﬁxed-effects model each participant acts as
their own control, thereby circumventing any bias
that could result from a participant’s spin decision dic-
tating the proportion of their trials that contribute to
each condition. To achieve this, subject was entered
into the model as a categorical predictor. Win and
loss probability were entered as linear predictors in
the model. The ﬁve levels of spin conditions (no
control, free/spin, free/no spin, pay/spin, pay/no spin)
were entered as a single categorical predictor, with no
control as the reference condition. Predicted values
were calculated for each spin condition for every par-
ticipant (with win and loss probability held constant),
and these values were averaged for graphing the
model’s predicted data, independent of whether or
not participants experienced each trial type. To plot
the observed data, a mean conﬁdence score was also
calculated for every trial type that a participant experi-
enced and was averaged across participants. These
observed averages were collapsed across all win and
loss probabilities, to include as much raw data as poss-
ible. Standard errors were calculated for the observed
data using a method that removes between-subject
variance in within-subject designs (Cousineau &
O’Brien, 2014). To plot the effects of win and loss prob-
abilities, thepredicted values andobserved valueswere
calculated the same way, this time holding spin con-
dition constant at the level of no control.
Model 2: Spin probability. On free spin and pay to
spin trials, we investigated predictors of spin
decisions. We used a generalized estimating equation
(GEE) to model the within-subject correlations, using a
logit link function given that the outcome variable
(spin or no spin) was binary. GEE is a powerful way
of analysing such data in balanced designs (i.e.,
where all participants contribute equally to all con-
ditions); this is appropriate for this model (but not
Models 1 and 3) as spin decision is the outcome vari-
able rather than a predictor. The predictor variables
that were considered for inclusion in the model
were spin condition (free spin or pay to spin), conﬁ-
dence,3 win probability, and loss probability, and the
interactions between these predictors. Conﬁdence
was mean-centred for each subject to achieve parity
with the ﬁxed-effects model. Conﬁdence and win
probability were initially entered into the same
model, but neither variable was signiﬁcant. Win prob-
ability was the least signiﬁcant predictor (win prob-
ability, z = 0.56 versus conﬁdence, z = 1.38), and the
quasi-likelihood information criterion was lower
when conﬁdence was included in the model than
when win probability was. Therefore, win probability
was removed from the analysis, and conﬁdence was
selected for inclusion. For plotting we calculated the
predicted spin probability at different levels of conﬁ-
dence and the upper and lower 95% conﬁdence
limits of these predictions.
Model 3: Subjective illusory control. To derive an
individual difference measure of subjective illusory
control, we looked at the effect of exercising illusory
control on conﬁdence ratings. First, we collapsed the
free/spin and pay/spin trials. A binary predictor repre-
senting the collapsed spin trials versus no control trials
was entered into a ﬁxed-effects model as an inter-
action with the categorical subject predictor. In
addition to this interaction term, win and loss prob-
ability were entered as linear predictors. This model
resulted in a beta value for each subject at the level
of no control, and a beta value for each subject at
the level of spin. The difference between these two
beta values indicated the change in conﬁdence
when a participant spun versus baseline, providing a
measure of subjective illusory control adjusting for
the different distributions of win and loss probabilities
amongst these conditions.
For each of the models on the card-guessing task,
leverage and standardized residuals were calculated
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for each data point to identify cases that had undue
inﬂuence on each model or where the model ﬁt was
poor. Unless stated otherwise, the assumptions of
each model was met, and the model was reliable
and was not unduly inﬂuenced by any cases. Similarly,
unless otherwise stated, assumptions of the sub-
sequent repeated measures analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) and correlation analyses were also met
(i.e., normality and sphericity).
Results
Card-guessing task
In the “pay to spin” condition, participants paid to
rotate the wheel on 19.4% (SD = 22.8) of trials on
average (see Table 1). More than half of our partici-
pants (50 of 78, 64.1%) paid to rotate the wheel on
at least one pay to spin trial, and 28 participants
(35.9%) paid on ﬁve or more trials. In the free spin con-
dition, a large majority of participants (69 of 78, 88.5%)
rotated the wheel at least once, and 76.9% did so on
ﬁve or more trials. This proportion was signiﬁcantly
greater on free spin trials than on pay to spin trials, t
(77) = 12.3, p < .001, dav = 1.46. On trials where partici-
pants elected to rotate the wheel, there was no differ-
ence in the mean number of movements (i.e., button
clicks) between the free spin (M= 4.21, SD = 1.53)
and pay to spin (M= 4.25, SD = 1.98) trials, t(45) =
−0.12, p = .902.
The analysis of conﬁdence ratings (Model 1)
revealed expected effects of win and loss probability.
As the win probability increased, conﬁdence ratings
increased, and as the loss probability increased, conﬁ-
dence ratings decreased (see Table 2 and Figure 2).
Compared to the no control condition, conﬁdence
ratings were higher in the free/spin, free/no spin, and
pay/spin conditions, but not in the pay/no spin con-
dition (see Table 2 and Figure 3). Pairwise contrasts
revealed that the difference in conﬁdence between
the free/spin and free/no spin conditions was only mar-
ginal, χ2(1) = 2.88, p = .090; that is to say, the actual
decision to rotate the segments did not signiﬁcantly
affect conﬁdence in the free condition. However, conﬁ-
dence was signiﬁcantly higher in the pay/spin con-
dition than in the pay/no spin condition, χ2(1) = 9.88,
p = .002, supporting the notion that illusory control is
better captured by spin decisions made under con-
ditions of ﬁnancial cost than tasks where control can
be exerted at no cost.
For the analysis of spin probability in Model 2 (see
Figure 4), we observed a signiﬁcant effect of spin con-
dition (free spin or pay to spin) when conﬁdence was
held constant at each participant’s mean: β (SE) = 1.87
(0.16), p < .0001, 95% conﬁdence interval, CI [1.55,
2.18]. At this average level of conﬁdence, the prob-
ability of spinning was higher in the free spin con-
dition than in the pay to spin condition. In the pay
to spin condition, as conﬁdence increased, the prob-
ability of spinning increased: β (SE) = 0.012 (0.006), p
< .05, 95% CI [0.001, 0.023]. However, in the free spin
condition, probability of spinning was not modulated
by conﬁdence: β (SE) =−0.002 (0.004), p = .07, 95% CI
[−0.007, 0.21]. This effect of conﬁdence on spinning
differed signiﬁcantly between the pay to spin and
free spin trials: Spin Condition × Conﬁdence inter-
action, β (SE) =−0.014 (0.007), p < .05, 95% CI
[−0.027, −0.001]. In Model 2, increasing loss prob-
ability also predicted increased likelihood of spinning:
β (SE) = 0.08 (0.04), p < .05, 95% CI [0.004, 0.16].
From Model 3 we derived a measure of subjective
illusory control for each participant, controlling for
win and loss probability, for use in the individual differ-
ences analyses. For this model, win probability and loss
probability continued to predict conﬁdence: win, β (SE)
= 9.39 (0.34), p < .0001, 95% CI [8.72, 10.06]; loss, β (SE)
=−1.76 (0.34), p < .0001, 95% CI [−2.42, −1.10].
Contingency Judgment task
The mean control ratings across the four conditions
indicated clear overestimations of control [25% loss,
Table 2. Predictors of conﬁdence ratings in the card-guessing task.
Predictors β (SE) Conﬁdence limits (95%)
Win probability 9.57 (0.27)*** 9.06, 10.10
Loss probability −1.81 (0.27)*** −2.33, 1.29
Free/no spin 2.09 (0.75)** 0.62, 3.57
Free/spin 3.48 (0.61)*** 2.29, 4.68
Pay/no spin 0.58 (0.57) −0.53, 1.70
Pay/spin 3.49 (0.92)*** 1.69, 5.30
Note: All levels of free and pay conditions were compared to the no
control baseline. SE = standard error. Subject was also entered as a
categorical predictor but the individual beta values are not reported
due to their arbitrary nature (derived from comparison to the ﬁrst
subject).
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for the primary variables on
the card-guessing task.
Variable No control Free spin Pay to spin
Decision to spin (max 18) — 10.5 (5.94) 3.41 (4.15)
Movements per trial — 4.21 (1.53) 4.25 (1.98)
Conﬁdence rating 23.0 (12.9) 25.9 (15.1) 24.1 (14.6)
Note: Decision to spin = number of trials in which participants chose to
move the win/loss segments.
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M = 8.92 (SD = 16.0); 25% win, M = 15.1 (SD = 18.2);
75% loss, M = 34.6 (SD = 33.4); 75% win, M = 43.1
(SD = 34.1)]. A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA
tested the effects of valence (win, loss) and reinforce-
ment rate (25%, 75%). Participants rated their control
signiﬁcantly higher in the 75% rate than in the 25%
rate [main effect, F(1, 77) = 68.3, p < .001, h2p = .47]. Par-
ticipants also rated their control as higher in win blocks
than in loss blocks [main effect, F(1, 77) = 12.3, p < .001,
h2p = .14]. The Valence × Reinforcement Rate inter-
action was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 77) = 0.37, p = .55.
The percentage of trials on which participants
pressed the space bar ranged from 51.6% to 55.6%
(SD = 16.0–22.8%) and did not differ signiﬁcantly
across conditions. For the subsequent individual
difference analyses, the control ratings across the
four task conditions were averaged to create the over-
estimation score (see Table 3). This variable was posi-
tively correlated with the rate of responding on the
task, r = .228, p = .045, consistent with previous
studies (Hannah & Beneteau, 2009; Matute, 1996).
Intentional Binding task
We observed a robust perceptual shift in the timing
estimates consistent with the established intentional
Figure 2. Modulation of conﬁdence ratings as a function of (a) win probability and (b) loss probability within no control trials. Diamond markers
indicate the mean and standard error of the observed data; lines indicate the values of conﬁdence predicted by the model.
Figure 3. Observed and predicted conﬁdence across the different
card-guessing task conditions. Diamond markers indicate the mean
and standard error of the observed data; black circles indicate the pre-
dicted values of conﬁdence. Predictions are calculated with win and
loss probability held constant covering three cards. The observed dis-
crepancy between the predicted and observed values is probably due
to the bias introduced in the observed data due the systematic differ-
ences in win and loss probabilities between spin and no spin trials in
the task.
Figure 4. Effect of conﬁdence and spin condition (free spin, pay to
spin) on the probability of spinning. Shaded area indicates 95% con-
ﬁdence limits.
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binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002). A 2 × 2 repeated
measures ANOVA conﬁrmed a highly signiﬁcant
Condition (baseline, operant) × Perceptual Judgment
(action, outcome) interaction, F (1, 77) = 58.6,
p < .001, h2p = .43. In the operant action condition,
key presses were perceived later than their actual
onsets (M= 6.48 ms, SD = 63.9), whereas in the base-
line action condition, key presses were perceived
earlier than their actual onsets (M=−21.2 ms, SD =
47.1), t(77) = 4.65, p < .001, d = 0.550. In contrast, in
the operant tone condition, the tones were perceived
earlier than their actual onsets (M=−47.9 ms, SD =
79.7), whereas in the baseline tone condition, tones
were perceived as later than their actual onsets (M=
8.17 ms, SD = 54.2), t(77) = 7.46, p < .001, d = 0.940.
Thus, the overall judgments for actions (M= 27.6 ms,
SD = 16.8) were shifted towards the tones, whereas
the overall judgments for outcomes were shifted
towards the key press (M=−56.0 ms, SD = 25.5).
An overall intentional binding score (M = 83.7 ms,
SD = 96.6) was calculated from the action binding
score minus the outcome binding score.
Correlations between illusory control and agency
To explore the relationships between the three tasks,
four composite scores were derived. A behavioural
measure of illusory control was deﬁned as the pro-
portion of pay to spin trials on which the participant
paid (this variable showed positive skew, but para-
metric and non-parametric tests yielded similar
results). Subjective illusory control on the card-guessing
task was quantiﬁed as the change in conﬁdence when
exercising illusory control (derived fromModel 3 for the
card-guessing task). The overestimation score from the
contingency judgment task was used as a measure of
explicit sense of agency, and the overall intentional
binding score was used as a measure of implicit
sense of agency. The correlations and mean scores
are provided in Table 3.
A signiﬁcant positive correlation was found
between proportion paid on the card-guessing task
and the overestimation score on the Contingency
Judgment task, r(78) = .34, p < .010, accounting for
11.7% of the variance (see Figure 5a). The subjective
illusory control score from the card-guessing task
was not signiﬁcantly associated with the overestima-
tion score. Although a robust intentional binding
effect was observed in the overall sample, intentional
binding scores did not correlate signiﬁcantly with pro-
portion paid (see Figure 5b) or subjective illusory
control from the card-guessing task, nor with the over-
estimation score on the Contingency Judgment task.
Using Steiger’s calculation, the correlation between
proportion paid and the overestimation score was
Table 3. Correlations between the card-guessing task and the sense of
agency tasks.
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Proportion paid — .17 .34** .03
2. Subjective illusory control 2.98 8.11 — .07 .08
3. Overestimation of control
score
25.4 18.7 — .05
4. Intentional binding score
(ms)
83.7 96.6 —
Note: Correlations: Pearson’s r. Proportion paid = proportion of pay to
spin trials on which the participant paid; subjective illusory control
was derived from Model 3 for the card-guessing task (score range
=−100 to +100); overestimation of control score from the Contin-
gency Judgment task.
**p < .01.
Figure 5. The correlation between proportion paid and (a) the Contingency Judgment task and (b) the Intentional Binding task.
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signiﬁcantly greater than the correlation between pro-
portion paid and intentional binding, ZH= 2.03, p = .04.
On the Locus of Control scale, there was no signiﬁ-
cant relationships between the three subscales and
the four behavioural variables (internal, r =−.04–.10,
p > .393; powerful others, r =−.16–.07, p > .176;
chance, r =−.08–.07, p > .471), except for the Locus
of Control Chance subscale and subjective illusory
control, r(71) = .25, p = .034.
Card-guessing task debrief questionnaire
The mean scores on the ﬁve debrief questions on per-
ceived control were each fairly low. On average, par-
ticipants perceived that little skill was involved in
winning the task (Question 1: M= 1.83, SD = 1.0),
they perceived little additional control from rotating
the segments (Question 2: M= 1.94, SD = 1.07), and
they reported little effect of moving the segments
on their conﬁdence (Question 5: M= 2.08, SD = 1.03).
Participants did not reliably endorse using the pre-
vious Ace locations to inﬂuence their decisions to
pay (Question 3: M= 2.22, SD = 1.35) or that previous
wins or losses affected their conﬁdence (Question 4:
M= 2.22, SD = 1.30). However, despite these low
ratings on average, each of these debrief questions
was signiﬁcantly correlated with both the proportion
paid variable, r(78) = .45–.57, p < .01, and the subjec-
tive illusory control score, r(71) = .22–.50, p < .05.
Discussion
This study developed a novel experimental task to dis-
tinguish between two operational deﬁnitions of illu-
sory control: a subjective component based upon
conﬁdence ratings, and a behavioural measure
based upon the participants’ willingness to pay
money in order to exercise control in a chance situ-
ation. The majority of our participants evidenced at
least some degree of illusory control on the behav-
ioural measure: Two thirds of our sample was pre-
pared to pay a fee to rotate the win and loss
segments on at least one trial. But importantly, this
was a distributed trait: One third of participants paid
to spin regularly, on at least ﬁve occasions, but
equally, another third refused to pay at all and were
effectively immune to the bias (see also Burger,
1986; Koehler et al., 1994). Subjective illusory control
was also clearly evident, in the elevated conﬁdence
scores when participants accepted the opportunity
to rotate the segments, compared to the no control
baseline. Conﬁdence ratings were also sensitive to
the size of the win and loss segments, as expected.
The subjective and behavioural variables were inter-
related: In the GEE analysis, participants were more
likely to rotate the wheel when their conﬁdence was
high, and this effect was signiﬁcantly stronger in the
pay to spin condition than in the free spin condition.
Participants who reported higher conﬁdence and
pay to spin decisions also reported more overt
beliefs about the level of skill and control in the
card-guessing task on a retrospective debrief ques-
tionnaire. These results help to consolidate a disparate
literature on illusory control that has used either sub-
jective or behavioural measures, showing consider-
able overlap between the two conceptualizations.
By employing a multi-shot task to derive measures
of the strength of illusory control in each participant,
we also explored individual differences in relation to
two domain-general, cognitive measures of agency.
The Contingency Judgment task and Intentional
Binding task were both successful in robustly inducing
their respective cognitive biases. On the Contingency
Judgment task, participants overestimated their
degree of control over the lightbulb illuminations,
and this was strongest in the condition with frequent
outcomes that were positively valenced. This has been
labelled the “outcome density effect” (Alloy & Abram-
son, 1979; Gillan et al., 2014). Participants with higher
response rates also reported stronger overestimations
of control, as observed previously (Hannah & Bene-
teau, 2009; Matute, 1996). On the Intentional Binding
task, we observed a substantial compression in the
subjective passage of time, whereby self-initiated
actions were perceived later, and their operant out-
comes were perceived earlier, than baseline judg-
ments of actions and tones occurring alone. This
created a mean Intentional Binding score of 84 ms
that is much in keeping with earlier papers using
this procedure (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002). Notably,
these two domain-general agency measures were
not signiﬁcantly inter-correlated (r = .05), consistent
with a proposed dichotomy between explicit and
implicit aspects of the sense of agency (Dewey & Kno-
blich, 2014; Moore et al., 2012). Neither of the agency
tests was related to trait scores on the Locus of Control
scale, consistent with the study by Dewey and Kno-
blich (2014). The only signiﬁcant relationship for
Locus of Control was for the external chance subscale
against the subjective illusory control parameter. This
subscale has been highlighted in a previous study in
problem gamblers (de Stadelhofen, Aufrère, Besson,
& Rossier, 2009) and may reﬂect unusual beliefs in
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the nature of fate and chance that have clear rel-
evance to the illusion of control. We note that the
coefﬁcient observed does not survive correction for
the three subscales of the Levenson questionnaire,
and that alternative self-report scales may better
capture aspects of self-efﬁcacy associated with gam-
bling illusory control (e.g., Paulhus, 1983).
The proportion of pay to spin decisions on the
card-guessing task was correlated signiﬁcantly with
control overestimations on the Contingency Judg-
ment task. In a formal test, this relationship was signiﬁ-
cantly stronger than the coefﬁcient for the same
illusory control measure against the intentional
binding effect. This relationship links domain-speciﬁc
illusory control in a gambling context to the broader
cognitive literature on the “sense of agency”. More
speciﬁcally, the willingness to pay in order to exert
control in a gambling game predicts the tendency to
explicitly overestimate causal associations between
random, non-contingent events. The Contingency
Judgment task was also abstract and did not present
gambling stimuli, involving only button presses and
lightbulb illumination. Our results help substantiate a
conjecture by Orgaz et al. (2013) that the heightened
overestimations of control they observed in pathologi-
cal gamblers performing the Contingency Judgment
task reﬂected a dispositional trait of enhanced illusory
control. Deﬁcits in explicit agency have further been
associated with delusions (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly,
& Woodward, 2013), reduced self-efﬁcacy (Taylor &
Brown, 1988), and superstitious beliefs (Rudski, 2001).
As illusory control mapped onto explicit judgments
of agency, as opposed to feelings of agency, our results
imply that gambling-related illusory control arises
from a reﬂective attributional process, rather than
from a distorted perceptual experience of action–
outcome relationships. Decisions to pay on the card-
guessing task are deliberate, goal-directed actions
that are likely to be moderated by both predictive
and inferential beliefs, as well as social and contextual
cues. These decisions, and conﬁdence ratings, were
both sensitive to the outcome probabilities in the
card-guessing task, although the probability of
winning and losing did not interact with condition. It
is also conceivable that alternative measures of illu-
sory control could detect associations with implicit
agency. Karsh and Eitam (2015) recently found that
both implicit and explicit judgments of agency play
distinct roles in action selection: Implicit agency was
reﬂected in the speed of responding, whereas explicit
agency predicted which action was selected. As the
card-guessing task emphasized action selection and
not response speed, other operationalizations could
detect links with intentional binding.
On the card-guessing task, our participants were
signiﬁcantly more likely to rotate the wheel in the
free spin condition than in the pay to spin condition.
This observation—that some individuals will exercise
control when there is no cost, but are not willing to
disadvantage themselves to gain such control—
echoes the ﬁndings from Grou and Tabak (2008)
who used a single-shot, between-subjects design.
Naturally, these effects would be expected to vary
further with the premium size (Dunn & Wilson,
1990), but it was beyond the aims of the current
study to explore those effects. At the same time, the
Condition × Conﬁdence interaction in the GEE model
indicates that conﬁdence was actually a stronger pre-
dictor of when participants would exercise control in
the pay to spin condition, compared to the free spin
condition. Similarly, in the ﬁxed-effects regression,
the mere opportunity for control, if declined, was not
sufﬁcient to reliably increase conﬁdence in the pay
to spin condition. In the free spin condition, conﬁ-
dence was boosted by the opportunity to spin, regard-
less of whether participants actually moved the wheel.
Overall, two effects are apparent here: (a) Conﬁdence
and decision making were more closely aligned when
the decision was costly than when it was free, and (b)
even within a fairly uniform, highly educated sample,
illusory control is a distributed, quantitative effect.
Some limitations should be noted. First, the design
of the card-guessing task allowed participants to exer-
cise control as often, or as little, as they wished. This
was effective in detecting individual differences, but
complicated task analysis, precluding a straightfor-
ward analysis of variance approach. It was necessary
to distinguish ﬁve conditions from the three trial
types (e.g., the pay to spin condition was further sep-
arated into trials where the opportunity to spin was
accepted versus declined). Seven participants rejected
all opportunities to rotate the wheel across both free
spin and pay to spin conditions; we could not calculate
a subjective illusory control score for these partici-
pants, who were therefore removed from the
models for the card-guessing task and the correlations
for the subjective illusory control parameter. Second,
by presenting the three trial types within a multi-
shot task, it is possible that the presence of the free
spin condition may have affected participants’ willing-
ness to pay to spin on other trials. That said, any such
inﬂuence would be expected to reduce the sensitivity
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of the pay to spin condition and increase Type 2 error
rather than false positives. Third, our analyses cannot
adjudicate on the causal directionality between conﬁ-
dence and illusory control decisions: It is possible that
decisions to exercise control enhanced conﬁdence, or
that high conﬁdence (e.g., from a prior success)
prompted subjects to exercise control. Fourth, within
a single experiment we were not able to characterize
a number of possible moderators, including gender,
the nature of the pay-off structure, or the precise
wording of the task instructions (Dunn & Wilson,
1990; Presson & Benassi, 1996). The instructions for
the card-guessing task sought to create an ambiguous
environment in order to maximize individual differ-
ences, rather than emphasizing either chance or skill
as the key determinant of success. Finally, our ﬁndings
from a well-educated undergraduate sample may not
generalize to illusory control in either regular or
problem gamblers, and both groups represent fruitful
targets for further investigation.
We believe that our results have a number of theor-
etical and practical implications. The distributed
nature of illusory control in a healthy, well-educated
sample highlights how this long-standing psychologi-
cal bias is certainly not restricted to individuals with
gambling problems, but equally, it does not appear
to reﬂect a human universal; roughly one third of
our participants fully refused to pay to exercise irrele-
vant control. Investigating the psychological charac-
teristics of these “resilient” individuals may shed
light on ways of attenuating illusory control in the
larger demographic who are susceptible to the bias.
From a methodological perspective, the dissociations
apparent in our data between conﬁdence ratings
and payment behaviour are problematic for the pro-
posal that “post-decision wagering” can serve as a
proxy for decision conﬁdence (Persaud, McLeod, &
Cowey, 2007). From the perspective of gambling
policy, illusory control can be elicited within gambling
games in a myriad of different ways: For example,
lottery players like to choose their favourite numbers
(Hardoon, Baboushkin, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2001),
and modern slot machines often include a stopping
device to brake the spinning reels (Ladouceur &
Sevigny, 2005). Our data support the inclusion of an
“illusory control” variable in systems currently in devel-
opment for gauging the likely public harms of any
speciﬁc (e.g., new) form of gambling (e.g., Meyer,
Fiebig, Häfeli, & Mörsen, 2011). Finally, our observed
association between gambling-related illusory
control and the Contingency Judgment task may be
useful for gambling researchers, as a means of asses-
sing control perceptions with a task that does not
involve direct gambling cues, which can induce crav-
ings and relapse in treatment-seeking individuals
(Hanss, Mentzoni, Grifﬁths, & Pallesen, 2015).
Notes
1. The primary reason for varying the segment sizes was to
encourage participants to vary their conﬁdence ratings
on a trial-to-trial basis, which we reasoned might
enhance any differences between the 3 control con-
ditions. It is an empirical question to what extent the illu-
sion of control varies across different probabilities of
winning or losing (cf. Gino et al., 2011) but we did not
have an a priori prediction about the nature or direction
of any such effect.
2. We note that Models 1 and 2 are not independent, and
actually address related questions: Model 1 examines
spin condition as a predictor of conﬁdence, and Model 2
includes conﬁdence as a predictor of likelihood of spinning.
Critically, Model 1 beneﬁts from the No Control baseline
condition; as this condition involves no actual decision,
those data were excluded in Model 2. Conversely, only
Model 2 directly tests spin “cost” (free or pay) as a factor
inﬂuencing whether or not participants exercised control.
3. We note that the conﬁdence rating was taken after the
spin decision. By including conﬁdence as a predictor of
the likelihood of spinning, we do not make any assump-
tions about the temporal order of these cognitions; we
are testing the simple prediction that decisions to exer-
cise control will be associated with higher levels of
conﬁdence.
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Appendix
Instructions for the novel card-guessing task
These instructions were presented to the participant on a printed
sheet, which was also read aloud by the experimenter:
You’re about to play a game which contains elements of
gambling. You will be playing for real money that you will be
awarded at the end, as a bonus payment.
You will be shown a table with 13 cards (the suit of Hearts)
arranged face down in a wheel. The aim of this game is to ﬁnd
the Ace in these cards. Two segments overlay the cards: a white
“win” segment and a red “lose” segment. The size of these seg-
ments will vary between trials. If the Ace lies within the “win”
segment you will win £1, however if the Ace lies within the
“lose” segment you will lose £1. If the Ace is within neither of
these segments, you will neither win nor lose any money.
On some trials, you will be given the option to choose the
position of the “win” and “lose” segments. If this is the case,
the onscreen arrows will be green. Otherwise, they will be
greyed out and the computer will choose the position of the seg-
ments. Sometimes it will be free to move the segments and
sometimes you will have to pay a small amount (10 p) to
enable the rotation. If you decide to rotate the wheel, click on
the green arrows, which will rotate the wheel one card at a
time, until you are happy with your choice.
Before the cards are revealed, you will be asked how conﬁ-
dent you are of a win. You can indicate this, using a sliding
scale, with the mouse. Click “OK” when you are happy with
your answer. The cards will then ﬂip over, revealing where the
Ace is and whether you have won or lost. The computer will
keep track of your balance and it will be displayed at the end.
We will give you £3 to play the game, in addition to the £5
that you have guaranteed for turning up.
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